mirror of
https://github.com/Relintai/pandemonium_engine.git
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4612 lines
152 KiB
C
4612 lines
152 KiB
C
/*
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* SSLv3/TLSv1 client-side functions
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*
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* Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
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* SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
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*
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* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
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* not use this file except in compliance with the License.
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* You may obtain a copy of the License at
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*
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* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
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*
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* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
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* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
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* WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
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* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
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* limitations under the License.
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*/
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#include "common.h"
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C)
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#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
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#include "mbedtls/ssl.h"
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#include "mbedtls/ssl_internal.h"
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#include "mbedtls/debug.h"
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#include "mbedtls/error.h"
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#include "mbedtls/constant_time.h"
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
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#include "mbedtls/psa_util.h"
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#include "psa/crypto.h"
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#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
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#include <string.h>
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#include <stdint.h>
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
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#include "mbedtls/platform_time.h"
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#endif
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
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#include "mbedtls/platform_util.h"
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#endif
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED)
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MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
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static int ssl_conf_has_static_psk( mbedtls_ssl_config const *conf )
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{
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if( conf->psk_identity == NULL ||
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conf->psk_identity_len == 0 )
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{
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return( 0 );
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}
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if( conf->psk != NULL && conf->psk_len != 0 )
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return( 1 );
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
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if( ! mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null( conf->psk_opaque ) )
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return( 1 );
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#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
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return( 0 );
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}
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
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MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
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static int ssl_conf_has_static_raw_psk( mbedtls_ssl_config const *conf )
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{
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if( conf->psk_identity == NULL ||
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conf->psk_identity_len == 0 )
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{
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return( 0 );
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}
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if( conf->psk != NULL && conf->psk_len != 0 )
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return( 1 );
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return( 0 );
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}
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#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
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#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
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MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
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static int ssl_write_hostname_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
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unsigned char *buf,
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const unsigned char *end,
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size_t *olen )
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{
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unsigned char *p = buf;
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size_t hostname_len;
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*olen = 0;
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if( ssl->hostname == NULL )
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return( 0 );
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3,
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( "client hello, adding server name extension: %s",
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ssl->hostname ) );
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hostname_len = strlen( ssl->hostname );
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MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, hostname_len + 9 );
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/*
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* Sect. 3, RFC 6066 (TLS Extensions Definitions)
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*
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* In order to provide any of the server names, clients MAY include an
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* extension of type "server_name" in the (extended) client hello. The
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* "extension_data" field of this extension SHALL contain
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* "ServerNameList" where:
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*
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* struct {
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* NameType name_type;
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* select (name_type) {
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* case host_name: HostName;
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* } name;
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* } ServerName;
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*
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* enum {
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* host_name(0), (255)
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* } NameType;
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*
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* opaque HostName<1..2^16-1>;
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*
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* struct {
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* ServerName server_name_list<1..2^16-1>
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* } ServerNameList;
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*
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*/
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MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME, p, 0 );
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p += 2;
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MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( hostname_len + 5, p, 0 );
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p += 2;
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MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( hostname_len + 3, p, 0 );
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p += 2;
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*p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME_HOSTNAME );
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MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( hostname_len, p, 0 );
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p += 2;
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memcpy( p, ssl->hostname, hostname_len );
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*olen = hostname_len + 9;
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return( 0 );
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}
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#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
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MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
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static int ssl_write_renegotiation_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
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unsigned char *buf,
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const unsigned char *end,
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size_t *olen )
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{
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unsigned char *p = buf;
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*olen = 0;
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/* We're always including a TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV in the
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* initial ClientHello, in which case also adding the renegotiation
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* info extension is NOT RECOMMENDED as per RFC 5746 Section 3.4. */
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if( ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS )
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return( 0 );
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3,
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( "client hello, adding renegotiation extension" ) );
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MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 5 + ssl->verify_data_len );
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/*
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* Secure renegotiation
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*/
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MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO, p, 0 );
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p += 2;
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*p++ = 0x00;
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*p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( ssl->verify_data_len + 1 );
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*p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( ssl->verify_data_len );
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memcpy( p, ssl->own_verify_data, ssl->verify_data_len );
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*olen = 5 + ssl->verify_data_len;
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return( 0 );
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}
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#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
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/*
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* Only if we handle at least one key exchange that needs signatures.
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*/
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \
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defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
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MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
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static int ssl_write_signature_algorithms_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
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unsigned char *buf,
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const unsigned char *end,
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size_t *olen )
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{
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unsigned char *p = buf;
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size_t sig_alg_len = 0;
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const int *md;
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
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unsigned char *sig_alg_list = buf + 6;
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#endif
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*olen = 0;
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if( ssl->conf->max_minor_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 )
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return( 0 );
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3,
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( "client hello, adding signature_algorithms extension" ) );
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if( ssl->conf->sig_hashes == NULL )
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return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG );
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for( md = ssl->conf->sig_hashes; *md != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; md++ )
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{
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
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sig_alg_len += 2;
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#endif
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
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sig_alg_len += 2;
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#endif
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if( sig_alg_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_SIG_HASH_ALG_LIST_LEN )
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{
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3,
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( "length in bytes of sig-hash-alg extension too big" ) );
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return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG );
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}
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}
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/* Empty signature algorithms list, this is a configuration error. */
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if( sig_alg_len == 0 )
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return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG );
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MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, sig_alg_len + 6 );
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/*
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* Prepare signature_algorithms extension (TLS 1.2)
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*/
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sig_alg_len = 0;
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for( md = ssl->conf->sig_hashes; *md != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; md++ )
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{
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
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sig_alg_list[sig_alg_len++] = mbedtls_ssl_hash_from_md_alg( *md );
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sig_alg_list[sig_alg_len++] = MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA;
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#endif
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C)
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sig_alg_list[sig_alg_len++] = mbedtls_ssl_hash_from_md_alg( *md );
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sig_alg_list[sig_alg_len++] = MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA;
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#endif
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}
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/*
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* enum {
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* none(0), md5(1), sha1(2), sha224(3), sha256(4), sha384(5),
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* sha512(6), (255)
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* } HashAlgorithm;
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*
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* enum { anonymous(0), rsa(1), dsa(2), ecdsa(3), (255) }
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* SignatureAlgorithm;
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*
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* struct {
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* HashAlgorithm hash;
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* SignatureAlgorithm signature;
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* } SignatureAndHashAlgorithm;
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*
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* SignatureAndHashAlgorithm
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* supported_signature_algorithms<2..2^16-2>;
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*/
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MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG, p, 0 );
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p += 2;
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MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( sig_alg_len + 2, p, 0 );
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p += 2;
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MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( sig_alg_len, p, 0 );
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p += 2;
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*olen = 6 + sig_alg_len;
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return( 0 );
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}
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#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 &&
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MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED */
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \
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defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
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MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
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static int ssl_write_supported_elliptic_curves_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
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unsigned char *buf,
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const unsigned char *end,
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size_t *olen )
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{
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unsigned char *p = buf;
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unsigned char *elliptic_curve_list = p + 6;
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size_t elliptic_curve_len = 0;
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const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *info;
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const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *grp_id;
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*olen = 0;
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3,
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( "client hello, adding supported_elliptic_curves extension" ) );
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if( ssl->conf->curve_list == NULL )
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return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG );
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for( grp_id = ssl->conf->curve_list;
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*grp_id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE;
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grp_id++ )
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{
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info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id( *grp_id );
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if( info == NULL )
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{
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
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( "invalid curve in ssl configuration" ) );
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return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG );
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}
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elliptic_curve_len += 2;
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if( elliptic_curve_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CURVE_LIST_LEN )
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{
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3,
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( "malformed supported_elliptic_curves extension in config" ) );
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return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG );
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}
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}
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/* Empty elliptic curve list, this is a configuration error. */
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if( elliptic_curve_len == 0 )
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return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_CONFIG );
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MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 6 + elliptic_curve_len );
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elliptic_curve_len = 0;
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for( grp_id = ssl->conf->curve_list;
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*grp_id != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE;
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grp_id++ )
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{
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info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id( *grp_id );
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elliptic_curve_list[elliptic_curve_len++] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( info->tls_id );
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elliptic_curve_list[elliptic_curve_len++] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( info->tls_id );
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}
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MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVES, p, 0 );
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p += 2;
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MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( elliptic_curve_len + 2, p, 0 );
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p += 2;
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MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( elliptic_curve_len, p, 0 );
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p += 2;
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*olen = 6 + elliptic_curve_len;
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return( 0 );
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}
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MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
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static int ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
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unsigned char *buf,
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const unsigned char *end,
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size_t *olen )
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{
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unsigned char *p = buf;
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(void) ssl; /* ssl used for debugging only */
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*olen = 0;
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3,
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( "client hello, adding supported_point_formats extension" ) );
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MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 6 );
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MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS, p, 0 );
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p += 2;
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*p++ = 0x00;
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*p++ = 2;
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*p++ = 1;
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*p++ = MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED;
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*olen = 6;
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return( 0 );
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}
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#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C ||
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MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
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MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
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static int ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
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unsigned char *buf,
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const unsigned char *end,
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size_t *olen )
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{
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int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
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unsigned char *p = buf;
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size_t kkpp_len;
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*olen = 0;
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/* Skip costly extension if we can't use EC J-PAKE anyway */
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if( mbedtls_ecjpake_check( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx ) != 0 )
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return( 0 );
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3,
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( "client hello, adding ecjpake_kkpp extension" ) );
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MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 4 );
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MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP, p, 0 );
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p += 2;
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/*
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* We may need to send ClientHello multiple times for Hello verification.
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* We don't want to compute fresh values every time (both for performance
|
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* and consistency reasons), so cache the extension content.
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*/
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if( ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache == NULL ||
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ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache_len == 0 )
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{
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "generating new ecjpake parameters" ) );
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ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx,
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p + 2, end - p - 2, &kkpp_len,
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ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng );
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if( ret != 0 )
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{
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1 ,
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"mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one", ret );
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return( ret );
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}
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ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache = mbedtls_calloc( 1, kkpp_len );
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if( ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache == NULL )
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{
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "allocation failed" ) );
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return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED );
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}
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memcpy( ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache, p + 2, kkpp_len );
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ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache_len = kkpp_len;
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}
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else
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{
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MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "re-using cached ecjpake parameters" ) );
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kkpp_len = ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache_len;
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MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p + 2, end, kkpp_len );
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memcpy( p + 2, ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache, kkpp_len );
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}
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MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( kkpp_len, p, 0 );
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p += 2;
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*olen = kkpp_len + 4;
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return( 0 );
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}
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#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
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#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
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MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
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static int ssl_write_cid_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
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unsigned char *buf,
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const unsigned char *end,
|
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size_t *olen )
|
|
{
|
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unsigned char *p = buf;
|
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size_t ext_len;
|
|
|
|
/*
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|
* Quoting draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05
|
|
* https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls-connection-id-05
|
|
*
|
|
* struct {
|
|
* opaque cid<0..2^8-1>;
|
|
* } ConnectionId;
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
*olen = 0;
|
|
if( ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ||
|
|
ssl->negotiate_cid == MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED )
|
|
{
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding CID extension" ) );
|
|
|
|
/* ssl->own_cid_len is at most MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_IN_LEN_MAX
|
|
* which is at most 255, so the increment cannot overflow. */
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, (unsigned)( ssl->own_cid_len + 5 ) );
|
|
|
|
/* Add extension ID + size */
|
|
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID, p, 0 );
|
|
p += 2;
|
|
ext_len = (size_t) ssl->own_cid_len + 1;
|
|
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( ext_len, p, 0 );
|
|
p += 2;
|
|
|
|
*p++ = (uint8_t) ssl->own_cid_len;
|
|
memcpy( p, ssl->own_cid, ssl->own_cid_len );
|
|
|
|
*olen = ssl->own_cid_len + 5;
|
|
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH)
|
|
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
|
|
static int ssl_write_max_fragment_length_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|
unsigned char *buf,
|
|
const unsigned char *end,
|
|
size_t *olen )
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char *p = buf;
|
|
|
|
*olen = 0;
|
|
|
|
if( ssl->conf->mfl_code == MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE )
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3,
|
|
( "client hello, adding max_fragment_length extension" ) );
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 5 );
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH, p, 0 );
|
|
p += 2;
|
|
|
|
*p++ = 0x00;
|
|
*p++ = 1;
|
|
|
|
*p++ = ssl->conf->mfl_code;
|
|
|
|
*olen = 5;
|
|
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC)
|
|
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
|
|
static int ssl_write_truncated_hmac_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|
unsigned char *buf,
|
|
const unsigned char *end,
|
|
size_t *olen )
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char *p = buf;
|
|
|
|
*olen = 0;
|
|
|
|
if( ssl->conf->trunc_hmac == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_DISABLED )
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3,
|
|
( "client hello, adding truncated_hmac extension" ) );
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 4 );
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC, p, 0 );
|
|
p += 2;
|
|
|
|
*p++ = 0x00;
|
|
*p++ = 0x00;
|
|
|
|
*olen = 4;
|
|
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
|
|
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
|
|
static int ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|
unsigned char *buf,
|
|
const unsigned char *end,
|
|
size_t *olen )
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char *p = buf;
|
|
|
|
*olen = 0;
|
|
|
|
if( ssl->conf->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED ||
|
|
ssl->conf->max_minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 )
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3,
|
|
( "client hello, adding encrypt_then_mac extension" ) );
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 4 );
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC, p, 0 );
|
|
p += 2;
|
|
|
|
*p++ = 0x00;
|
|
*p++ = 0x00;
|
|
|
|
*olen = 4;
|
|
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
|
|
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
|
|
static int ssl_write_extended_ms_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|
unsigned char *buf,
|
|
const unsigned char *end,
|
|
size_t *olen )
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char *p = buf;
|
|
|
|
*olen = 0;
|
|
|
|
if( ssl->conf->extended_ms == MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED ||
|
|
ssl->conf->max_minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 )
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3,
|
|
( "client hello, adding extended_master_secret extension" ) );
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 4 );
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET, p, 0 );
|
|
p += 2;
|
|
|
|
*p++ = 0x00;
|
|
*p++ = 0x00;
|
|
|
|
*olen = 4;
|
|
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
|
|
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
|
|
static int ssl_write_session_ticket_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|
unsigned char *buf,
|
|
const unsigned char *end,
|
|
size_t *olen )
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char *p = buf;
|
|
size_t tlen = ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_len;
|
|
|
|
*olen = 0;
|
|
|
|
if( ssl->conf->session_tickets == MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_DISABLED )
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3,
|
|
( "client hello, adding session ticket extension" ) );
|
|
|
|
/* The addition is safe here since the ticket length is 16 bit. */
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 4 + tlen );
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET, p, 0 );
|
|
p += 2;
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( tlen, p, 0 );
|
|
p += 2;
|
|
|
|
*olen = 4;
|
|
|
|
if( ssl->session_negotiate->ticket == NULL || tlen == 0 )
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3,
|
|
( "sending session ticket of length %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, tlen ) );
|
|
|
|
memcpy( p, ssl->session_negotiate->ticket, tlen );
|
|
|
|
*olen += tlen;
|
|
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
|
|
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
|
|
static int ssl_write_alpn_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|
unsigned char *buf,
|
|
const unsigned char *end,
|
|
size_t *olen )
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char *p = buf;
|
|
size_t alpnlen = 0;
|
|
const char **cur;
|
|
|
|
*olen = 0;
|
|
|
|
if( ssl->conf->alpn_list == NULL )
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding alpn extension" ) );
|
|
|
|
for( cur = ssl->conf->alpn_list; *cur != NULL; cur++ )
|
|
alpnlen += strlen( *cur ) + 1;
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 6 + alpnlen );
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN, p, 0 );
|
|
p += 2;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* opaque ProtocolName<1..2^8-1>;
|
|
*
|
|
* struct {
|
|
* ProtocolName protocol_name_list<2..2^16-1>
|
|
* } ProtocolNameList;
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/* Skip writing extension and list length for now */
|
|
p += 4;
|
|
|
|
for( cur = ssl->conf->alpn_list; *cur != NULL; cur++ )
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* mbedtls_ssl_conf_set_alpn_protocols() checked that the length of
|
|
* protocol names is less than 255.
|
|
*/
|
|
*p = (unsigned char)strlen( *cur );
|
|
memcpy( p + 1, *cur, *p );
|
|
p += 1 + *p;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*olen = p - buf;
|
|
|
|
/* List length = olen - 2 (ext_type) - 2 (ext_len) - 2 (list_len) */
|
|
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( *olen - 6, buf, 4 );
|
|
|
|
/* Extension length = olen - 2 (ext_type) - 2 (ext_len) */
|
|
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( *olen - 4, buf, 2 );
|
|
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP)
|
|
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
|
|
static int ssl_write_use_srtp_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|
unsigned char *buf,
|
|
const unsigned char *end,
|
|
size_t *olen )
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned char *p = buf;
|
|
size_t protection_profiles_index = 0, ext_len = 0;
|
|
uint16_t mki_len = 0, profile_value = 0;
|
|
|
|
*olen = 0;
|
|
|
|
if( ( ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) ||
|
|
( ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list == NULL ) ||
|
|
( ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len == 0 ) )
|
|
{
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* RFC 5764 section 4.1.1
|
|
* uint8 SRTPProtectionProfile[2];
|
|
*
|
|
* struct {
|
|
* SRTPProtectionProfiles SRTPProtectionProfiles;
|
|
* opaque srtp_mki<0..255>;
|
|
* } UseSRTPData;
|
|
* SRTPProtectionProfile SRTPProtectionProfiles<2..2^16-1>;
|
|
*/
|
|
if( ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_mki_support == MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_SUPPORTED )
|
|
{
|
|
mki_len = ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Extension length = 2 bytes for profiles length,
|
|
* ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len * 2 (each profile is 2 bytes length ),
|
|
* 1 byte for srtp_mki vector length and the mki_len value
|
|
*/
|
|
ext_len = 2 + 2 * ( ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len ) + 1 + mki_len;
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, adding use_srtp extension" ) );
|
|
|
|
/* Check there is room in the buffer for the extension + 4 bytes
|
|
* - the extension tag (2 bytes)
|
|
* - the extension length (2 bytes)
|
|
*/
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, ext_len + 4 );
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_USE_SRTP, p, 0 );
|
|
p += 2;
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( ext_len, p, 0 );
|
|
p += 2;
|
|
|
|
/* protection profile length: 2*(ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len) */
|
|
/* micro-optimization:
|
|
* the list size is limited to MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_MAX_PROFILE_LIST_LENGTH
|
|
* which is lower than 127, so the upper byte of the length is always 0
|
|
* For the documentation, the more generic code is left in comments
|
|
* *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ( 2 * ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len )
|
|
* >> 8 ) & 0xFF );
|
|
*/
|
|
*p++ = 0;
|
|
*p++ = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( 2 * ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len );
|
|
|
|
for( protection_profiles_index=0;
|
|
protection_profiles_index < ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len;
|
|
protection_profiles_index++ )
|
|
{
|
|
profile_value = mbedtls_ssl_check_srtp_profile_value
|
|
( ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list[protection_profiles_index] );
|
|
if( profile_value != MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ssl_write_use_srtp_ext, add profile: %04x",
|
|
profile_value ) );
|
|
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( profile_value, p, 0 );
|
|
p += 2;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* Note: we shall never arrive here as protection profiles
|
|
* is checked by mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_srtp_protection_profiles function
|
|
*/
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3,
|
|
( "client hello, "
|
|
"illegal DTLS-SRTP protection profile %d",
|
|
ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list[protection_profiles_index]
|
|
) );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED );
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*p++ = mki_len & 0xFF;
|
|
|
|
if( mki_len != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
memcpy( p, ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value, mki_len );
|
|
/*
|
|
* Increment p to point to the current position.
|
|
*/
|
|
p += mki_len;
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "sending mki", ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value,
|
|
ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* total extension length: extension type (2 bytes)
|
|
* + extension length (2 bytes)
|
|
* + protection profile length (2 bytes)
|
|
* + 2 * number of protection profiles
|
|
* + srtp_mki vector length(1 byte)
|
|
* + mki value
|
|
*/
|
|
*olen = p - buf;
|
|
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Generate random bytes for ClientHello
|
|
*/
|
|
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
|
|
static int ssl_generate_random( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
|
|
{
|
|
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
|
|
unsigned char *p = ssl->handshake->randbytes;
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
|
|
mbedtls_time_t t;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* When responding to a verify request, MUST reuse random (RFC 6347 4.2.1)
|
|
*/
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
|
|
if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM &&
|
|
ssl->handshake->verify_cookie != NULL )
|
|
{
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
|
|
t = mbedtls_time( NULL );
|
|
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT32_BE( t, p, 0 );
|
|
p += 4;
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, current time: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_LONGLONG,
|
|
(long long) t ) );
|
|
#else
|
|
if( ( ret = ssl->conf->f_rng( ssl->conf->p_rng, p, 4 ) ) != 0 )
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
|
|
p += 4;
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */
|
|
|
|
if( ( ret = ssl->conf->f_rng( ssl->conf->p_rng, p, 28 ) ) != 0 )
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* \brief Validate cipher suite against config in SSL context.
|
|
*
|
|
* \param suite_info cipher suite to validate
|
|
* \param ssl SSL context
|
|
* \param min_minor_ver Minimal minor version to accept a cipher suite
|
|
* \param max_minor_ver Maximal minor version to accept a cipher suite
|
|
*
|
|
* \return 0 if valid, else 1
|
|
*/
|
|
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
|
|
static int ssl_validate_ciphersuite(
|
|
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t * suite_info,
|
|
const mbedtls_ssl_context * ssl,
|
|
int min_minor_ver, int max_minor_ver )
|
|
{
|
|
(void) ssl;
|
|
if( suite_info == NULL )
|
|
return( 1 );
|
|
|
|
if( suite_info->min_minor_ver > max_minor_ver ||
|
|
suite_info->max_minor_ver < min_minor_ver )
|
|
return( 1 );
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
|
|
if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM &&
|
|
( suite_info->flags & MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS ) )
|
|
return( 1 );
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C)
|
|
if( ssl->conf->arc4_disabled == MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_DISABLED &&
|
|
suite_info->cipher == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128 )
|
|
return( 1 );
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
|
|
if( suite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE &&
|
|
mbedtls_ecjpake_check( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx ) != 0 )
|
|
return( 1 );
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* Don't suggest PSK-based ciphersuite if no PSK is available. */
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED)
|
|
if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk( suite_info ) &&
|
|
ssl_conf_has_static_psk( ssl->conf ) == 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
return( 1 );
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */
|
|
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
|
|
static int ssl_write_client_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
|
|
{
|
|
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
|
|
size_t i, n, olen, ext_len = 0;
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *buf;
|
|
unsigned char *p, *q;
|
|
const unsigned char *end;
|
|
|
|
unsigned char offer_compress;
|
|
const int *ciphersuites;
|
|
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info;
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \
|
|
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
|
|
int uses_ec = 0;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write client hello" ) );
|
|
|
|
if( ssl->conf->f_rng == NULL )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "no RNG provided") );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_RNG );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int renegotiating = 0;
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
|
|
if( ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE )
|
|
renegotiating = 1;
|
|
#endif
|
|
if( !renegotiating )
|
|
{
|
|
ssl->major_ver = ssl->conf->min_major_ver;
|
|
ssl->minor_ver = ssl->conf->min_minor_ver;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if( ssl->conf->max_major_ver == 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
|
|
( "configured max major version is invalid, consider using mbedtls_ssl_config_defaults()" ) );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
buf = ssl->out_msg;
|
|
end = buf + MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Check if there's enough space for the first part of the ClientHello
|
|
* consisting of the 38 bytes described below, the session identifier (at
|
|
* most 32 bytes) and its length (1 byte).
|
|
*
|
|
* Use static upper bounds instead of the actual values
|
|
* to allow the compiler to optimize this away.
|
|
*/
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( buf, end, 38 + 1 + 32 );
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The 38 first bytes of the ClientHello:
|
|
* 0 . 0 handshake type (written later)
|
|
* 1 . 3 handshake length (written later)
|
|
* 4 . 5 highest version supported
|
|
* 6 . 9 current UNIX time
|
|
* 10 . 37 random bytes
|
|
*
|
|
* The current UNIX time (4 bytes) and following 28 random bytes are written
|
|
* by ssl_generate_random() into ssl->handshake->randbytes buffer and then
|
|
* copied from there into the output buffer.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
p = buf + 4;
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_write_version( ssl->conf->max_major_ver,
|
|
ssl->conf->max_minor_ver,
|
|
ssl->conf->transport, p );
|
|
p += 2;
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, max version: [%d:%d]",
|
|
buf[4], buf[5] ) );
|
|
|
|
if( ( ret = ssl_generate_random( ssl ) ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_generate_random", ret );
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memcpy( p, ssl->handshake->randbytes, 32 );
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, random bytes", p, 32 );
|
|
p += 32;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* 38 . 38 session id length
|
|
* 39 . 39+n session id
|
|
* 39+n . 39+n DTLS only: cookie length (1 byte)
|
|
* 40+n . .. DTLS only: cookie
|
|
* .. . .. ciphersuitelist length (2 bytes)
|
|
* .. . .. ciphersuitelist
|
|
* .. . .. compression methods length (1 byte)
|
|
* .. . .. compression methods
|
|
* .. . .. extensions length (2 bytes)
|
|
* .. . .. extensions
|
|
*/
|
|
n = ssl->session_negotiate->id_len;
|
|
|
|
if( n < 16 || n > 32 ||
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
|
|
ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE ||
|
|
#endif
|
|
ssl->handshake->resume == 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
n = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
|
|
/*
|
|
* RFC 5077 section 3.4: "When presenting a ticket, the client MAY
|
|
* generate and include a Session ID in the TLS ClientHello."
|
|
*/
|
|
if( !renegotiating )
|
|
{
|
|
if( ssl->session_negotiate->ticket != NULL &&
|
|
ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_len != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
ret = ssl->conf->f_rng( ssl->conf->p_rng,
|
|
ssl->session_negotiate->id, 32 );
|
|
|
|
if( ret != 0 )
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
|
|
ssl->session_negotiate->id_len = n = 32;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The first check of the output buffer size above (
|
|
* MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( buf, end, 38 + 1 + 32 );)
|
|
* has checked that there is enough space in the output buffer for the
|
|
* session identifier length byte and the session identifier (n <= 32).
|
|
*/
|
|
*p++ = (unsigned char) n;
|
|
|
|
for( i = 0; i < n; i++ )
|
|
*p++ = ssl->session_negotiate->id[i];
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, session id len.: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, n ) );
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, session id", buf + 39, n );
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* With 'n' being the length of the session identifier
|
|
*
|
|
* 39+n . 39+n DTLS only: cookie length (1 byte)
|
|
* 40+n . .. DTLS only: cookie
|
|
* .. . .. ciphersuitelist length (2 bytes)
|
|
* .. . .. ciphersuitelist
|
|
* .. . .. compression methods length (1 byte)
|
|
* .. . .. compression methods
|
|
* .. . .. extensions length (2 bytes)
|
|
* .. . .. extensions
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* DTLS cookie
|
|
*/
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
|
|
if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 1 );
|
|
|
|
if( ssl->handshake->verify_cookie == NULL )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "no verify cookie to send" ) );
|
|
*p++ = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, cookie",
|
|
ssl->handshake->verify_cookie,
|
|
ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len );
|
|
|
|
*p++ = ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len;
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end,
|
|
ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len );
|
|
memcpy( p, ssl->handshake->verify_cookie,
|
|
ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len );
|
|
p += ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Ciphersuite list
|
|
*/
|
|
ciphersuites = ssl->conf->ciphersuite_list[ssl->minor_ver];
|
|
|
|
/* Skip writing ciphersuite length for now */
|
|
n = 0;
|
|
q = p;
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 2 );
|
|
p += 2;
|
|
|
|
for( i = 0; ciphersuites[i] != 0; i++ )
|
|
{
|
|
ciphersuite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( ciphersuites[i] );
|
|
|
|
if( ssl_validate_ciphersuite( ciphersuite_info, ssl,
|
|
ssl->conf->min_minor_ver,
|
|
ssl->conf->max_minor_ver ) != 0 )
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, add ciphersuite: %#04x (%s)",
|
|
(unsigned int)ciphersuites[i], ciphersuite_info->name ) );
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \
|
|
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
|
|
uses_ec |= mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec( ciphersuite_info );
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 2 );
|
|
|
|
n++;
|
|
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( ciphersuites[i], p, 0 );
|
|
p += 2;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3,
|
|
( "client hello, got %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " ciphersuites (excluding SCSVs)", n ) );
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Add TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV
|
|
*/
|
|
if( !renegotiating )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "adding EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV" ) );
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 2 );
|
|
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_SSL_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO, p, 0 );
|
|
p += 2;
|
|
n++;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Some versions of OpenSSL don't handle it correctly if not at end */
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV)
|
|
if( ssl->conf->fallback == MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_FALLBACK )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "adding FALLBACK_SCSV" ) );
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 2 );
|
|
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV_VALUE, p, 0 );
|
|
p += 2;
|
|
n++;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
*q++ = (unsigned char)( n >> 7 );
|
|
*q++ = (unsigned char)( n << 1 );
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT)
|
|
offer_compress = 1;
|
|
#else
|
|
offer_compress = 0;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We don't support compression with DTLS right now: if many records come
|
|
* in the same datagram, uncompressing one could overwrite the next one.
|
|
* We don't want to add complexity for handling that case unless there is
|
|
* an actual need for it.
|
|
*/
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
|
|
if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
|
|
offer_compress = 0;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if( offer_compress )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, compress len.: %d", 2 ) );
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, compress alg.: %d %d",
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL ) );
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 3 );
|
|
*p++ = 2;
|
|
*p++ = MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE;
|
|
*p++ = MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, compress len.: %d", 1 ) );
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, compress alg.: %d",
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL ) );
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 2 );
|
|
*p++ = 1;
|
|
*p++ = MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* First write extensions, then the total length */
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_CHK_BUF_PTR( p, end, 2 );
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION)
|
|
if( ( ret = ssl_write_hostname_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len,
|
|
end, &olen ) ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_hostname_ext", ret );
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
ext_len += olen;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* Note that TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV is always added
|
|
* even if MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION is not defined. */
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
|
|
if( ( ret = ssl_write_renegotiation_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len,
|
|
end, &olen ) ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_renegotiation_ext", ret );
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
ext_len += olen;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \
|
|
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_CERT_ENABLED)
|
|
if( ( ret = ssl_write_signature_algorithms_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len,
|
|
end, &olen ) ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_signature_algorithms_ext", ret );
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
ext_len += olen;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \
|
|
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
|
|
if( uses_ec )
|
|
{
|
|
if( ( ret = ssl_write_supported_elliptic_curves_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len,
|
|
end, &olen ) ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_supported_elliptic_curves_ext", ret );
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
ext_len += olen;
|
|
|
|
if( ( ret = ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len,
|
|
end, &olen ) ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext", ret );
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
ext_len += olen;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
|
|
if( ( ret = ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len,
|
|
end, &olen ) ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext", ret );
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
ext_len += olen;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
|
|
if( ( ret = ssl_write_cid_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, end, &olen ) ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_cid_ext", ret );
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
ext_len += olen;
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH)
|
|
if( ( ret = ssl_write_max_fragment_length_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len,
|
|
end, &olen ) ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_max_fragment_length_ext", ret );
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
ext_len += olen;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC)
|
|
if( ( ret = ssl_write_truncated_hmac_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len,
|
|
end, &olen ) ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_truncated_hmac_ext", ret );
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
ext_len += olen;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
|
|
if( ( ret = ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len,
|
|
end, &olen ) ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext", ret );
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
ext_len += olen;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
|
|
if( ( ret = ssl_write_extended_ms_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len,
|
|
end, &olen ) ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_extended_ms_ext", ret );
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
ext_len += olen;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
|
|
if( ( ret = ssl_write_alpn_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len,
|
|
end, &olen ) ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_alpn_ext", ret );
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
ext_len += olen;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP)
|
|
if( ( ret = ssl_write_use_srtp_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len,
|
|
end, &olen ) ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_use_srtp_ext", ret );
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
ext_len += olen;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
|
|
if( ( ret = ssl_write_session_ticket_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len,
|
|
end, &olen ) ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_write_session_ticket_ext", ret );
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
ext_len += olen;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* olen unused if all extensions are disabled */
|
|
((void) olen);
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello, total extension length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET,
|
|
ext_len ) );
|
|
|
|
if( ext_len > 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
/* No need to check for space here, because the extension
|
|
* writing functions already took care of that. */
|
|
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( ext_len, p, 0 );
|
|
p += 2 + ext_len;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssl->out_msglen = p - buf;
|
|
ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE;
|
|
ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO;
|
|
|
|
ssl->state++;
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
|
|
if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_send_flight_completed( ssl );
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( ssl ) ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret );
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
|
|
if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM &&
|
|
( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit( ssl ) ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit", ret );
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write client hello" ) );
|
|
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
|
|
static int ssl_parse_renegotiation_info( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|
const unsigned char *buf,
|
|
size_t len )
|
|
{
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
|
|
if( ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE )
|
|
{
|
|
/* Check verify-data in constant-time. The length OTOH is no secret */
|
|
if( len != 1 + ssl->verify_data_len * 2 ||
|
|
buf[0] != ssl->verify_data_len * 2 ||
|
|
mbedtls_ct_memcmp( buf + 1,
|
|
ssl->own_verify_data, ssl->verify_data_len ) != 0 ||
|
|
mbedtls_ct_memcmp( buf + 1 + ssl->verify_data_len,
|
|
ssl->peer_verify_data, ssl->verify_data_len ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-matching renegotiation info" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
|
|
ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
|
|
{
|
|
if( len != 1 || buf[0] != 0x00 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
|
|
( "non-zero length renegotiation info" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
|
|
ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssl->secure_renegotiation = MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH)
|
|
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
|
|
static int ssl_parse_max_fragment_length_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|
const unsigned char *buf,
|
|
size_t len )
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* server should use the extension only if we did,
|
|
* and if so the server's value should match ours (and len is always 1)
|
|
*/
|
|
if( ssl->conf->mfl_code == MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE ||
|
|
len != 1 ||
|
|
buf[0] != ssl->conf->mfl_code )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
|
|
( "non-matching max fragment length extension" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
|
|
ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC)
|
|
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
|
|
static int ssl_parse_truncated_hmac_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|
const unsigned char *buf,
|
|
size_t len )
|
|
{
|
|
if( ssl->conf->trunc_hmac == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_DISABLED ||
|
|
len != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
|
|
( "non-matching truncated HMAC extension" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
|
|
ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
((void) buf);
|
|
|
|
ssl->session_negotiate->trunc_hmac = MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_ENABLED;
|
|
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
|
|
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
|
|
static int ssl_parse_cid_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|
const unsigned char *buf,
|
|
size_t len )
|
|
{
|
|
size_t peer_cid_len;
|
|
|
|
if( /* CID extension only makes sense in DTLS */
|
|
ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ||
|
|
/* The server must only send the CID extension if we have offered it. */
|
|
ssl->negotiate_cid == MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_DISABLED )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "CID extension unexpected" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if( len == 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "CID extension invalid" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
peer_cid_len = *buf++;
|
|
len--;
|
|
|
|
if( peer_cid_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_OUT_LEN_MAX )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "CID extension invalid" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if( len != peer_cid_len )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "CID extension invalid" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssl->handshake->cid_in_use = MBEDTLS_SSL_CID_ENABLED;
|
|
ssl->handshake->peer_cid_len = (uint8_t) peer_cid_len;
|
|
memcpy( ssl->handshake->peer_cid, buf, peer_cid_len );
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "Use of CID extension negotiated" ) );
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "Server CID", buf, peer_cid_len );
|
|
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
|
|
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
|
|
static int ssl_parse_encrypt_then_mac_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|
const unsigned char *buf,
|
|
size_t len )
|
|
{
|
|
if( ssl->conf->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_DISABLED ||
|
|
ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ||
|
|
len != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
|
|
( "non-matching encrypt-then-MAC extension" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
|
|
ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
((void) buf);
|
|
|
|
ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac = MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED;
|
|
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
|
|
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
|
|
static int ssl_parse_extended_ms_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|
const unsigned char *buf,
|
|
size_t len )
|
|
{
|
|
if( ssl->conf->extended_ms == MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED ||
|
|
ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ||
|
|
len != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
|
|
( "non-matching extended master secret extension" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
|
|
ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
((void) buf);
|
|
|
|
ssl->handshake->extended_ms = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED;
|
|
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
|
|
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
|
|
static int ssl_parse_session_ticket_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|
const unsigned char *buf,
|
|
size_t len )
|
|
{
|
|
if( ssl->conf->session_tickets == MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS_DISABLED ||
|
|
len != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
|
|
( "non-matching session ticket extension" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
|
|
ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
((void) buf);
|
|
|
|
ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket = 1;
|
|
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \
|
|
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
|
|
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
|
|
static int ssl_parse_supported_point_formats_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|
const unsigned char *buf,
|
|
size_t len )
|
|
{
|
|
size_t list_size;
|
|
const unsigned char *p;
|
|
|
|
if( len == 0 || (size_t)( buf[0] + 1 ) != len )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
|
|
}
|
|
list_size = buf[0];
|
|
|
|
p = buf + 1;
|
|
while( list_size > 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
if( p[0] == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED ||
|
|
p[0] == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED )
|
|
{
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C)
|
|
ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.point_format = p[0];
|
|
#endif
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
|
|
ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx.point_format = p[0];
|
|
#endif
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 4, ( "point format selected: %d", p[0] ) );
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
list_size--;
|
|
p++;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "no point format in common" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C ||
|
|
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
|
|
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
|
|
static int ssl_parse_ecjpake_kkpp( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|
const unsigned char *buf,
|
|
size_t len )
|
|
{
|
|
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
|
|
|
|
if( ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->key_exchange !=
|
|
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "skip ecjpake kkpp extension" ) );
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* If we got here, we no longer need our cached extension */
|
|
mbedtls_free( ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache );
|
|
ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache = NULL;
|
|
ssl->handshake->ecjpake_cache_len = 0;
|
|
|
|
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx,
|
|
buf, len ) ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one", ret );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
|
|
ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
|
|
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
|
|
static int ssl_parse_alpn_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|
const unsigned char *buf, size_t len )
|
|
{
|
|
size_t list_len, name_len;
|
|
const char **p;
|
|
|
|
/* If we didn't send it, the server shouldn't send it */
|
|
if( ssl->conf->alpn_list == NULL )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-matching ALPN extension" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
|
|
ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNSUPPORTED_EXT );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* opaque ProtocolName<1..2^8-1>;
|
|
*
|
|
* struct {
|
|
* ProtocolName protocol_name_list<2..2^16-1>
|
|
* } ProtocolNameList;
|
|
*
|
|
* the "ProtocolNameList" MUST contain exactly one "ProtocolName"
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/* Min length is 2 (list_len) + 1 (name_len) + 1 (name) */
|
|
if( len < 4 )
|
|
{
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
list_len = ( buf[0] << 8 ) | buf[1];
|
|
if( list_len != len - 2 )
|
|
{
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
name_len = buf[2];
|
|
if( name_len != list_len - 1 )
|
|
{
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Check that the server chosen protocol was in our list and save it */
|
|
for( p = ssl->conf->alpn_list; *p != NULL; p++ )
|
|
{
|
|
if( name_len == strlen( *p ) &&
|
|
memcmp( buf + 3, *p, name_len ) == 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
ssl->alpn_chosen = *p;
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "ALPN extension: no matching protocol" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP)
|
|
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
|
|
static int ssl_parse_use_srtp_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|
const unsigned char *buf,
|
|
size_t len )
|
|
{
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_srtp_profile server_protection = MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET;
|
|
size_t i, mki_len = 0;
|
|
uint16_t server_protection_profile_value = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* If use_srtp is not configured, just ignore the extension */
|
|
if( ( ssl->conf->transport != MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) ||
|
|
( ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list == NULL ) ||
|
|
( ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len == 0 ) )
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
|
|
/* RFC 5764 section 4.1.1
|
|
* uint8 SRTPProtectionProfile[2];
|
|
*
|
|
* struct {
|
|
* SRTPProtectionProfiles SRTPProtectionProfiles;
|
|
* opaque srtp_mki<0..255>;
|
|
* } UseSRTPData;
|
|
|
|
* SRTPProtectionProfile SRTPProtectionProfiles<2..2^16-1>;
|
|
*
|
|
*/
|
|
if( ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_mki_support == MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP_MKI_SUPPORTED )
|
|
{
|
|
mki_len = ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Length is 5 + optional mki_value : one protection profile length (2 bytes)
|
|
* + protection profile (2 bytes)
|
|
* + mki_len(1 byte)
|
|
* and optional srtp_mki
|
|
*/
|
|
if( ( len < 5 ) || ( len != ( buf[4] + 5u ) ) )
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* get the server protection profile
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* protection profile length must be 0x0002 as we must have only
|
|
* one protection profile in server Hello
|
|
*/
|
|
if( ( buf[0] != 0 ) || ( buf[1] != 2 ) )
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
|
|
|
|
server_protection_profile_value = ( buf[2] << 8 ) | buf[3];
|
|
server_protection = mbedtls_ssl_check_srtp_profile_value(
|
|
server_protection_profile_value );
|
|
if( server_protection != MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found srtp profile: %s",
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_get_srtp_profile_as_string(
|
|
server_protection ) ) );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile = MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Check we have the server profile in our list
|
|
*/
|
|
for( i=0; i < ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list_len; i++)
|
|
{
|
|
if( server_protection == ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list[i] )
|
|
{
|
|
ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile = ssl->conf->dtls_srtp_profile_list[i];
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "selected srtp profile: %s",
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_get_srtp_profile_as_string(
|
|
server_protection ) ) );
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* If no match was found : server problem, it shall never answer with incompatible profile */
|
|
if( ssl->dtls_srtp_info.chosen_dtls_srtp_profile == MBEDTLS_TLS_SRTP_UNSET )
|
|
{
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* If server does not use mki in its reply, make sure the client won't keep
|
|
* one as negotiated */
|
|
if( len == 5 )
|
|
{
|
|
ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* RFC5764:
|
|
* If the client detects a nonzero-length MKI in the server's response
|
|
* that is different than the one the client offered, then the client
|
|
* MUST abort the handshake and SHOULD send an invalid_parameter alert.
|
|
*/
|
|
if( len > 5 && ( buf[4] != mki_len ||
|
|
( memcmp( ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value, &buf[5], mki_len ) ) ) )
|
|
{
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
|
|
}
|
|
#if defined (MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C)
|
|
if( len > 5 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "received mki", ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_value,
|
|
ssl->dtls_srtp_info.mki_len );
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Parse HelloVerifyRequest. Only called after verifying the HS type.
|
|
*/
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
|
|
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
|
|
static int ssl_parse_hello_verify_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
|
|
{
|
|
const unsigned char *p = ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl );
|
|
int major_ver, minor_ver;
|
|
unsigned char cookie_len;
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse hello verify request" ) );
|
|
|
|
/* Check that there is enough room for:
|
|
* - 2 bytes of version
|
|
* - 1 byte of cookie_len
|
|
*/
|
|
if( mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 3 > ssl->in_msglen )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
|
|
( "incoming HelloVerifyRequest message is too short" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* struct {
|
|
* ProtocolVersion server_version;
|
|
* opaque cookie<0..2^8-1>;
|
|
* } HelloVerifyRequest;
|
|
*/
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server version", p, 2 );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_read_version( &major_ver, &minor_ver, ssl->conf->transport, p );
|
|
p += 2;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Since the RFC is not clear on this point, accept DTLS 1.0 (TLS 1.1)
|
|
* even is lower than our min version.
|
|
*/
|
|
if( major_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 ||
|
|
minor_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2 ||
|
|
major_ver > ssl->conf->max_major_ver ||
|
|
minor_ver > ssl->conf->max_minor_ver )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server version" ) );
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION );
|
|
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_PROTOCOL_VERSION );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
cookie_len = *p++;
|
|
if( ( ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_msglen ) - p < cookie_len )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
|
|
( "cookie length does not match incoming message size" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
|
|
}
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "cookie", p, cookie_len );
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_free( ssl->handshake->verify_cookie );
|
|
|
|
ssl->handshake->verify_cookie = mbedtls_calloc( 1, cookie_len );
|
|
if( ssl->handshake->verify_cookie == NULL )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "alloc failed (%d bytes)", cookie_len ) );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memcpy( ssl->handshake->verify_cookie, p, cookie_len );
|
|
ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len = cookie_len;
|
|
|
|
/* Start over at ClientHello */
|
|
ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO;
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_reset_checksum( ssl );
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed( ssl );
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse hello verify request" ) );
|
|
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
|
|
|
|
static int is_compression_bad( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char comp )
|
|
{
|
|
int bad_comp = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* Suppress warnings in some configurations */
|
|
(void) ssl;
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT)
|
|
/* See comments in ssl_write_client_hello() */
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
|
|
if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM &&
|
|
comp != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL )
|
|
bad_comp = 1;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if( comp != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL &&
|
|
comp != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE )
|
|
bad_comp = 1;
|
|
#else /* MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT */
|
|
if( comp != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL )
|
|
bad_comp = 1;
|
|
#endif/* MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT */
|
|
return bad_comp;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
|
|
static int ssl_parse_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
|
|
{
|
|
int ret, i;
|
|
size_t n;
|
|
size_t ext_len;
|
|
unsigned char *buf, *ext;
|
|
unsigned char comp;
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
|
|
int renegotiation_info_seen = 0;
|
|
#endif
|
|
int handshake_failure = 0;
|
|
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *suite_info;
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse server hello" ) );
|
|
|
|
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
/* No alert on a read error. */
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret );
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
buf = ssl->in_msg;
|
|
|
|
if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE )
|
|
{
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
|
|
if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS )
|
|
{
|
|
ssl->renego_records_seen++;
|
|
|
|
if( ssl->conf->renego_max_records >= 0 &&
|
|
ssl->renego_records_seen > ssl->conf->renego_max_records )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
|
|
( "renegotiation requested, but not honored by server" ) );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
|
|
( "non-handshake message during renegotiation" ) );
|
|
|
|
ssl->keep_current_message = 1;
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_WAITING_SERVER_HELLO_RENEGO );
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
|
|
ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
|
|
if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
|
|
{
|
|
if( buf[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "received hello verify request" ) );
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse server hello" ) );
|
|
return( ssl_parse_hello_verify_request( ssl ) );
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
/* We made it through the verification process */
|
|
mbedtls_free( ssl->handshake->verify_cookie );
|
|
ssl->handshake->verify_cookie = NULL;
|
|
ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
|
|
|
|
if( ssl->in_hslen < 38 + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) ||
|
|
buf[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* 0 . 1 server_version
|
|
* 2 . 33 random (maybe including 4 bytes of Unix time)
|
|
* 34 . 34 session_id length = n
|
|
* 35 . 34+n session_id
|
|
* 35+n . 36+n cipher_suite
|
|
* 37+n . 37+n compression_method
|
|
*
|
|
* 38+n . 39+n extensions length (optional)
|
|
* 40+n . .. extensions
|
|
*/
|
|
buf += mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl );
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server hello, version", buf + 0, 2 );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_read_version( &ssl->major_ver, &ssl->minor_ver,
|
|
ssl->conf->transport, buf + 0 );
|
|
|
|
if( ssl->major_ver < ssl->conf->min_major_ver ||
|
|
ssl->minor_ver < ssl->conf->min_minor_ver ||
|
|
ssl->major_ver > ssl->conf->max_major_ver ||
|
|
ssl->minor_ver > ssl->conf->max_minor_ver )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
|
|
( "server version out of bounds - min: [%d:%d], server: [%d:%d], max: [%d:%d]",
|
|
ssl->conf->min_major_ver,
|
|
ssl->conf->min_minor_ver,
|
|
ssl->major_ver, ssl->minor_ver,
|
|
ssl->conf->max_major_ver,
|
|
ssl->conf->max_minor_ver ) );
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION );
|
|
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_PROTOCOL_VERSION );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, current time: %lu",
|
|
( (unsigned long) buf[2] << 24 ) |
|
|
( (unsigned long) buf[3] << 16 ) |
|
|
( (unsigned long) buf[4] << 8 ) |
|
|
( (unsigned long) buf[5] ) ) );
|
|
|
|
memcpy( ssl->handshake->randbytes + 32, buf + 2, 32 );
|
|
|
|
n = buf[34];
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server hello, random bytes", buf + 2, 32 );
|
|
|
|
if( n > 32 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if( ssl->in_hslen > mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 39 + n )
|
|
{
|
|
ext_len = ( ( buf[38 + n] << 8 )
|
|
| ( buf[39 + n] ) );
|
|
|
|
if( ( ext_len > 0 && ext_len < 4 ) ||
|
|
ssl->in_hslen != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 40 + n + ext_len )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
|
|
ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else if( ssl->in_hslen == mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 38 + n )
|
|
{
|
|
ext_len = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* ciphersuite (used later) */
|
|
i = ( buf[35 + n] << 8 ) | buf[36 + n];
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Read and check compression
|
|
*/
|
|
comp = buf[37 + n];
|
|
|
|
if( is_compression_bad( ssl, comp ) )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
|
|
( "server hello, bad compression: %d", comp ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
|
|
ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Initialize update checksum functions
|
|
*/
|
|
ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( i );
|
|
if( ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info == NULL )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
|
|
( "ciphersuite info for %04x not found", (unsigned int)i ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_optimize_checksum( ssl, ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info );
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, session id len.: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, n ) );
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server hello, session id", buf + 35, n );
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Check if the session can be resumed
|
|
*/
|
|
if( ssl->handshake->resume == 0 || n == 0 ||
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
|
|
ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE ||
|
|
#endif
|
|
ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite != i ||
|
|
ssl->session_negotiate->compression != comp ||
|
|
ssl->session_negotiate->id_len != n ||
|
|
memcmp( ssl->session_negotiate->id, buf + 35, n ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
ssl->state++;
|
|
ssl->handshake->resume = 0;
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME)
|
|
ssl->session_negotiate->start = mbedtls_time( NULL );
|
|
#endif
|
|
ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite = i;
|
|
ssl->session_negotiate->compression = comp;
|
|
ssl->session_negotiate->id_len = n;
|
|
memcpy( ssl->session_negotiate->id, buf + 35, n );
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "%s session has been resumed",
|
|
ssl->handshake->resume ? "a" : "no" ) );
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, chosen ciphersuite: %04x", (unsigned) i ) );
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, compress alg.: %d",
|
|
buf[37 + n] ) );
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Perform cipher suite validation in same way as in ssl_write_client_hello.
|
|
*/
|
|
i = 0;
|
|
while( 1 )
|
|
{
|
|
if( ssl->conf->ciphersuite_list[ssl->minor_ver][i] == 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
|
|
ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if( ssl->conf->ciphersuite_list[ssl->minor_ver][i++] ==
|
|
ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite )
|
|
{
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
suite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id(
|
|
ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite );
|
|
if( ssl_validate_ciphersuite( suite_info, ssl, ssl->minor_ver,
|
|
ssl->minor_ver ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
|
|
ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3,
|
|
( "server hello, chosen ciphersuite: %s", suite_info->name ) );
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED)
|
|
if( suite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA &&
|
|
ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 )
|
|
{
|
|
ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if( comp != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT)
|
|
&& comp != MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE
|
|
#endif
|
|
)
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
|
|
ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
|
|
}
|
|
ssl->session_negotiate->compression = comp;
|
|
|
|
ext = buf + 40 + n;
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2,
|
|
( "server hello, total extension length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, ext_len ) );
|
|
|
|
while( ext_len )
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned int ext_id = ( ( ext[0] << 8 )
|
|
| ( ext[1] ) );
|
|
unsigned int ext_size = ( ( ext[2] << 8 )
|
|
| ( ext[3] ) );
|
|
|
|
if( ext_size + 4 > ext_len )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
|
|
ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
switch( ext_id )
|
|
{
|
|
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO:
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found renegotiation extension" ) );
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
|
|
renegotiation_info_seen = 1;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if( ( ret = ssl_parse_renegotiation_info( ssl, ext + 4,
|
|
ext_size ) ) != 0 )
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH)
|
|
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH:
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3,
|
|
( "found max_fragment_length extension" ) );
|
|
|
|
if( ( ret = ssl_parse_max_fragment_length_ext( ssl,
|
|
ext + 4, ext_size ) ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC)
|
|
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC:
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found truncated_hmac extension" ) );
|
|
|
|
if( ( ret = ssl_parse_truncated_hmac_ext( ssl,
|
|
ext + 4, ext_size ) ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID)
|
|
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_CID:
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found CID extension" ) );
|
|
|
|
if( ( ret = ssl_parse_cid_ext( ssl,
|
|
ext + 4,
|
|
ext_size ) ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_CONNECTION_ID */
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
|
|
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC:
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found encrypt_then_mac extension" ) );
|
|
|
|
if( ( ret = ssl_parse_encrypt_then_mac_ext( ssl,
|
|
ext + 4, ext_size ) ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
|
|
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET:
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3,
|
|
( "found extended_master_secret extension" ) );
|
|
|
|
if( ( ret = ssl_parse_extended_ms_ext( ssl,
|
|
ext + 4, ext_size ) ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
|
|
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET:
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found session_ticket extension" ) );
|
|
|
|
if( ( ret = ssl_parse_session_ticket_ext( ssl,
|
|
ext + 4, ext_size ) ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \
|
|
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
|
|
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS:
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3,
|
|
( "found supported_point_formats extension" ) );
|
|
|
|
if( ( ret = ssl_parse_supported_point_formats_ext( ssl,
|
|
ext + 4, ext_size ) ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C ||
|
|
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
|
|
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP:
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found ecjpake_kkpp extension" ) );
|
|
|
|
if( ( ret = ssl_parse_ecjpake_kkpp( ssl,
|
|
ext + 4, ext_size ) ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN)
|
|
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN:
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found alpn extension" ) );
|
|
|
|
if( ( ret = ssl_parse_alpn_ext( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size ) ) != 0 )
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP)
|
|
case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_USE_SRTP:
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found use_srtp extension" ) );
|
|
|
|
if( ( ret = ssl_parse_use_srtp_ext( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size ) ) != 0 )
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_SRTP */
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3,
|
|
( "unknown extension found: %u (ignoring)", ext_id ) );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ext_len -= 4 + ext_size;
|
|
ext += 4 + ext_size;
|
|
|
|
if( ext_len > 0 && ext_len < 4 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello message" ) );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys() has to be called after the parsing of the
|
|
* extensions. It sets the transform data for the resumed session which in
|
|
* case of DTLS includes the server CID extracted from the CID extension.
|
|
*/
|
|
if( ssl->handshake->resume )
|
|
{
|
|
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( ssl ) ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys", ret );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
|
|
ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR );
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Renegotiation security checks
|
|
*/
|
|
if( ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION &&
|
|
ssl->conf->allow_legacy_renegotiation ==
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
|
|
( "legacy renegotiation, breaking off handshake" ) );
|
|
handshake_failure = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION)
|
|
else if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS &&
|
|
ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION &&
|
|
renegotiation_info_seen == 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
|
|
( "renegotiation_info extension missing (secure)" ) );
|
|
handshake_failure = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
else if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS &&
|
|
ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION &&
|
|
ssl->conf->allow_legacy_renegotiation ==
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "legacy renegotiation not allowed" ) );
|
|
handshake_failure = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
else if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS &&
|
|
ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION &&
|
|
renegotiation_info_seen == 1 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
|
|
( "renegotiation_info extension present (legacy)" ) );
|
|
handshake_failure = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */
|
|
|
|
if( handshake_failure == 1 )
|
|
{
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
|
|
ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse server hello" ) );
|
|
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
|
|
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED)
|
|
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
|
|
static int ssl_parse_server_dh_params( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|
unsigned char **p,
|
|
unsigned char *end )
|
|
{
|
|
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
|
|
size_t dhm_actual_bitlen;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Ephemeral DH parameters:
|
|
*
|
|
* struct {
|
|
* opaque dh_p<1..2^16-1>;
|
|
* opaque dh_g<1..2^16-1>;
|
|
* opaque dh_Ys<1..2^16-1>;
|
|
* } ServerDHParams;
|
|
*/
|
|
if( ( ret = mbedtls_dhm_read_params( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx,
|
|
p, end ) ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 2, ( "mbedtls_dhm_read_params" ), ret );
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
dhm_actual_bitlen = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.P );
|
|
if( dhm_actual_bitlen < ssl->conf->dhm_min_bitlen )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "DHM prime too short: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET " < %u",
|
|
dhm_actual_bitlen,
|
|
ssl->conf->dhm_min_bitlen ) );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: P ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.P );
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: G ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.G );
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: GY", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.GY );
|
|
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED ||
|
|
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
|
|
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \
|
|
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \
|
|
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \
|
|
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED)
|
|
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
|
|
static int ssl_check_server_ecdh_params( const mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
|
|
{
|
|
const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info;
|
|
mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id;
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT)
|
|
grp_id = ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.grp.id;
|
|
#else
|
|
grp_id = ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.grp_id;
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_LEGACY_CONTEXT */
|
|
|
|
curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_grp_id( grp_id );
|
|
if( curve_info == NULL )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "ECDH curve: %s", curve_info->name ) );
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C)
|
|
if( mbedtls_ssl_check_curve( ssl, grp_id ) != 0 )
|
|
return( -1 );
|
|
#else
|
|
if( ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.grp.nbits < 163 ||
|
|
ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.grp.nbits > 521 )
|
|
return( -1 );
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_ECP_C */
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH( 3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
|
|
MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_QP );
|
|
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED ||
|
|
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED ||
|
|
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED ||
|
|
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED ||
|
|
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \
|
|
( defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
|
|
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) )
|
|
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
|
|
static int ssl_parse_server_ecdh_params_psa( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|
unsigned char **p,
|
|
unsigned char *end )
|
|
{
|
|
uint16_t tls_id;
|
|
size_t ecdh_bits = 0;
|
|
uint8_t ecpoint_len;
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Parse ECC group
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if( end - *p < 4 )
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
|
|
|
|
/* First byte is curve_type; only named_curve is handled */
|
|
if( *(*p)++ != MBEDTLS_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE )
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
|
|
|
|
/* Next two bytes are the namedcurve value */
|
|
tls_id = *(*p)++;
|
|
tls_id <<= 8;
|
|
tls_id |= *(*p)++;
|
|
|
|
/* Check it's a curve we offered */
|
|
if( mbedtls_ssl_check_curve_tls_id( ssl, tls_id ) != 0 )
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
|
|
|
|
/* Convert EC group to PSA key type. */
|
|
if( ( handshake->ecdh_psa_type =
|
|
mbedtls_psa_parse_tls_ecc_group( tls_id, &ecdh_bits ) ) == 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
|
|
}
|
|
if( ecdh_bits > 0xffff )
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
|
|
handshake->ecdh_bits = (uint16_t) ecdh_bits;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Put peer's ECDH public key in the format understood by PSA.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
ecpoint_len = *(*p)++;
|
|
if( (size_t)( end - *p ) < ecpoint_len )
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
|
|
|
|
if( mbedtls_psa_tls_ecpoint_to_psa_ec(
|
|
*p, ecpoint_len,
|
|
handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey,
|
|
sizeof( handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey ),
|
|
&handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey_len ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*p += ecpoint_len;
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO &&
|
|
( MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED ||
|
|
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED ) */
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
|
|
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \
|
|
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED)
|
|
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
|
|
static int ssl_parse_server_ecdh_params( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|
unsigned char **p,
|
|
unsigned char *end )
|
|
{
|
|
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Ephemeral ECDH parameters:
|
|
*
|
|
* struct {
|
|
* ECParameters curve_params;
|
|
* ECPoint public;
|
|
* } ServerECDHParams;
|
|
*/
|
|
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_read_params( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
|
|
(const unsigned char **) p, end ) ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "mbedtls_ecdh_read_params" ), ret );
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED)
|
|
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS )
|
|
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS;
|
|
#endif
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if( ssl_check_server_ecdh_params( ssl ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
|
|
( "bad server key exchange message (ECDHE curve)" ) );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED ||
|
|
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED ||
|
|
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED)
|
|
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
|
|
static int ssl_parse_server_psk_hint( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|
unsigned char **p,
|
|
unsigned char *end )
|
|
{
|
|
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
|
|
uint16_t len;
|
|
((void) ssl);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* PSK parameters:
|
|
*
|
|
* opaque psk_identity_hint<0..2^16-1>;
|
|
*/
|
|
if( end - (*p) < 2 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
|
|
( "bad server key exchange message (psk_identity_hint length)" ) );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
|
|
}
|
|
len = (*p)[0] << 8 | (*p)[1];
|
|
*p += 2;
|
|
|
|
if( end - (*p) < len )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
|
|
( "bad server key exchange message (psk_identity_hint length)" ) );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Note: we currently ignore the PSK identity hint, as we only allow one
|
|
* PSK to be provisioned on the client. This could be changed later if
|
|
* someone needs that feature.
|
|
*/
|
|
*p += len;
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
|
|
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED)
|
|
/*
|
|
* Generate a pre-master secret and encrypt it with the server's RSA key
|
|
*/
|
|
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
|
|
static int ssl_write_encrypted_pms( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|
size_t offset, size_t *olen,
|
|
size_t pms_offset )
|
|
{
|
|
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
|
|
size_t len_bytes = ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ? 0 : 2;
|
|
unsigned char *p = ssl->handshake->premaster + pms_offset;
|
|
mbedtls_pk_context * peer_pk;
|
|
|
|
if( offset + len_bytes > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small for encrypted pms" ) );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Generate (part of) the pre-master as
|
|
* struct {
|
|
* ProtocolVersion client_version;
|
|
* opaque random[46];
|
|
* } PreMasterSecret;
|
|
*/
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_write_version( ssl->conf->max_major_ver,
|
|
ssl->conf->max_minor_ver,
|
|
ssl->conf->transport, p );
|
|
|
|
if( ( ret = ssl->conf->f_rng( ssl->conf->p_rng, p + 2, 46 ) ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "f_rng", ret );
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssl->handshake->pmslen = 48;
|
|
|
|
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
|
|
peer_pk = &ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey;
|
|
#else /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
|
|
if( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL )
|
|
{
|
|
/* Should never happen */
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
|
|
}
|
|
peer_pk = &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk;
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Now write it out, encrypted
|
|
*/
|
|
if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( peer_pk, MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "certificate key type mismatch" ) );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_encrypt( peer_pk,
|
|
p, ssl->handshake->pmslen,
|
|
ssl->out_msg + offset + len_bytes, olen,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - offset - len_bytes,
|
|
ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ) ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt", ret );
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \
|
|
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
|
|
if( len_bytes == 2 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( *olen, ssl->out_msg, offset );
|
|
*olen += 2;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
|
|
/* We don't need the peer's public key anymore. Free it. */
|
|
mbedtls_pk_free( peer_pk );
|
|
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED ||
|
|
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
|
|
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
|
|
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED)
|
|
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
|
|
static int ssl_parse_signature_algorithm( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl,
|
|
unsigned char **p,
|
|
unsigned char *end,
|
|
mbedtls_md_type_t *md_alg,
|
|
mbedtls_pk_type_t *pk_alg )
|
|
{
|
|
((void) ssl);
|
|
*md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE;
|
|
*pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_NONE;
|
|
|
|
/* Only in TLS 1.2 */
|
|
if( ssl->minor_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 )
|
|
{
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if( (*p) + 2 > end )
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Get hash algorithm
|
|
*/
|
|
if( ( *md_alg = mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash( (*p)[0] ) )
|
|
== MBEDTLS_MD_NONE )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
|
|
( "Server used unsupported HashAlgorithm %d", *(p)[0] ) );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Get signature algorithm
|
|
*/
|
|
if( ( *pk_alg = mbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sig( (*p)[1] ) )
|
|
== MBEDTLS_PK_NONE )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
|
|
( "server used unsupported SignatureAlgorithm %d", (*p)[1] ) );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Check if the hash is acceptable
|
|
*/
|
|
if( mbedtls_ssl_check_sig_hash( ssl, *md_alg ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
|
|
( "server used HashAlgorithm %d that was not offered", *(p)[0] ) );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Server used SignatureAlgorithm %d",
|
|
(*p)[1] ) );
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "Server used HashAlgorithm %d",
|
|
(*p)[0] ) );
|
|
*p += 2;
|
|
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED ||
|
|
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED ||
|
|
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED */
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \
|
|
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED)
|
|
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
|
|
static int ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
|
|
{
|
|
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
|
|
const mbedtls_ecp_keypair *peer_key;
|
|
mbedtls_pk_context * peer_pk;
|
|
|
|
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
|
|
peer_pk = &ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey;
|
|
#else /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
|
|
if( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL )
|
|
{
|
|
/* Should never happen */
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
|
|
}
|
|
peer_pk = &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk;
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
|
|
|
|
/* This is a public key, so it can't be opaque, so can_do() is a good
|
|
* enough check to ensure pk_ec() is safe to use below. */
|
|
if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( peer_pk, MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ) )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "server key not ECDH capable" ) );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
peer_key = mbedtls_pk_ec( *peer_pk );
|
|
|
|
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_get_params( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, peer_key,
|
|
MBEDTLS_ECDH_THEIRS ) ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "mbedtls_ecdh_get_params" ), ret );
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if( ssl_check_server_ecdh_params( ssl ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server certificate (ECDH curve)" ) );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
|
|
/* We don't need the peer's public key anymore. Free it,
|
|
* so that more RAM is available for upcoming expensive
|
|
* operations like ECDHE. */
|
|
mbedtls_pk_free( peer_pk );
|
|
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
|
|
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) ||
|
|
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
|
|
static int ssl_parse_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
|
|
{
|
|
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
|
|
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
|
|
ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info;
|
|
unsigned char *p = NULL, *end = NULL;
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse server key exchange" ) );
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED)
|
|
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse server key exchange" ) );
|
|
ssl->state++;
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
((void) p);
|
|
((void) end);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \
|
|
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED)
|
|
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA ||
|
|
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA )
|
|
{
|
|
if( ( ret = ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert( ssl ) ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert", ret );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
|
|
ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse server key exchange" ) );
|
|
ssl->state++;
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
((void) p);
|
|
((void) end);
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED ||
|
|
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED)
|
|
if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled &&
|
|
ssl->handshake->ecrs_state == ssl_ecrs_ske_start_processing )
|
|
{
|
|
goto start_processing;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret );
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
|
|
ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* ServerKeyExchange may be skipped with PSK and RSA-PSK when the server
|
|
* doesn't use a psk_identity_hint
|
|
*/
|
|
if( ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE )
|
|
{
|
|
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK ||
|
|
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK )
|
|
{
|
|
/* Current message is probably either
|
|
* CertificateRequest or ServerHelloDone */
|
|
ssl->keep_current_message = 1;
|
|
goto exit;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
|
|
( "server key exchange message must not be skipped" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
|
|
ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
|
|
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED)
|
|
if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled )
|
|
ssl->handshake->ecrs_state = ssl_ecrs_ske_start_processing;
|
|
|
|
start_processing:
|
|
#endif
|
|
p = ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl );
|
|
end = ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_hslen;
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server key exchange", p, end - p );
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED)
|
|
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK ||
|
|
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK ||
|
|
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK ||
|
|
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK )
|
|
{
|
|
if( ssl_parse_server_psk_hint( ssl, &p, end ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
|
|
ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
|
|
}
|
|
} /* FALLTHROUGH */
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) || \
|
|
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED)
|
|
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK ||
|
|
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK )
|
|
; /* nothing more to do */
|
|
else
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED ||
|
|
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
|
|
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED)
|
|
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA ||
|
|
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK )
|
|
{
|
|
if( ssl_parse_server_dh_params( ssl, &p, end ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
|
|
ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED ||
|
|
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \
|
|
( defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
|
|
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) )
|
|
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA ||
|
|
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA )
|
|
{
|
|
if( ssl_parse_server_ecdh_params_psa( ssl, &p, end ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
|
|
ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO &&
|
|
( MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED ||
|
|
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED ) */
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
|
|
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \
|
|
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED)
|
|
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA ||
|
|
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK ||
|
|
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA )
|
|
{
|
|
if( ssl_parse_server_ecdh_params( ssl, &p, end ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
|
|
ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED ||
|
|
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED ||
|
|
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED */
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
|
|
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE )
|
|
{
|
|
ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx,
|
|
p, end - p );
|
|
if( ret != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two", ret );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
|
|
ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED)
|
|
if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_server_signature( ciphersuite_info ) )
|
|
{
|
|
size_t sig_len, hashlen;
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
|
|
unsigned char hash[PSA_HASH_MAX_SIZE];
|
|
#else
|
|
unsigned char hash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE];
|
|
#endif
|
|
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE;
|
|
mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg = MBEDTLS_PK_NONE;
|
|
unsigned char *params = ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl );
|
|
size_t params_len = p - params;
|
|
void *rs_ctx = NULL;
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_pk_context * peer_pk;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Handle the digitally-signed structure
|
|
*/
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
|
|
if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 )
|
|
{
|
|
if( ssl_parse_signature_algorithm( ssl, &p, end,
|
|
&md_alg, &pk_alg ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
|
|
( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
|
|
ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if( pk_alg !=
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg( ciphersuite_info ) )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
|
|
( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
|
|
ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \
|
|
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1)
|
|
if( ssl->minor_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 )
|
|
{
|
|
pk_alg = mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg( ciphersuite_info );
|
|
|
|
/* Default hash for ECDSA is SHA-1 */
|
|
if( pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA && md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE )
|
|
md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
#endif
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Read signature
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if( p > end - 2 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
|
|
ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
|
|
}
|
|
sig_len = ( p[0] << 8 ) | p[1];
|
|
p += 2;
|
|
|
|
if( p != end - sig_len )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
|
|
ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "signature", p, sig_len );
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Compute the hash that has been signed
|
|
*/
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \
|
|
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1)
|
|
if( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE )
|
|
{
|
|
hashlen = 36;
|
|
ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_ssl_tls( ssl, hash, params,
|
|
params_len );
|
|
if( ret != 0 )
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || \
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \
|
|
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
|
|
if( md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE )
|
|
{
|
|
ret = mbedtls_ssl_get_key_exchange_md_tls1_2( ssl, hash, &hashlen,
|
|
params, params_len,
|
|
md_alg );
|
|
if( ret != 0 )
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || \
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "parameters hash", hash, hashlen );
|
|
|
|
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
|
|
peer_pk = &ssl->handshake->peer_pubkey;
|
|
#else /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
|
|
if( ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL )
|
|
{
|
|
/* Should never happen */
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
|
|
}
|
|
peer_pk = &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk;
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Verify signature
|
|
*/
|
|
if( !mbedtls_pk_can_do( peer_pk, pk_alg ) )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server key exchange message" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
|
|
ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED)
|
|
if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled )
|
|
rs_ctx = &ssl->handshake->ecrs_ctx.pk;
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED */
|
|
|
|
if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_verify_restartable( peer_pk,
|
|
md_alg, hash, hashlen, p, sig_len, rs_ctx ) ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED)
|
|
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_pk_verify", ret );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS );
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED */
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
|
|
ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECRYPT_ERROR );
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_pk_verify", ret );
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE)
|
|
/* We don't need the peer's public key anymore. Free it,
|
|
* so that more RAM is available for upcoming expensive
|
|
* operations like ECDHE. */
|
|
mbedtls_pk_free( peer_pk );
|
|
#endif /* !MBEDTLS_SSL_KEEP_PEER_CERTIFICATE */
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_WITH_SERVER_SIGNATURE_ENABLED */
|
|
|
|
exit:
|
|
ssl->state++;
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse server key exchange" ) );
|
|
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if ! defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED)
|
|
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
|
|
static int ssl_parse_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
|
|
{
|
|
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
|
|
ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info;
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse certificate request" ) );
|
|
|
|
if( ! mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed( ciphersuite_info ) )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse certificate request" ) );
|
|
ssl->state++;
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
|
|
}
|
|
#else /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */
|
|
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
|
|
static int ssl_parse_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
|
|
{
|
|
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
|
|
unsigned char *buf;
|
|
size_t n = 0;
|
|
size_t cert_type_len = 0, dn_len = 0;
|
|
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
|
|
ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info;
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse certificate request" ) );
|
|
|
|
if( ! mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed( ciphersuite_info ) )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse certificate request" ) );
|
|
ssl->state++;
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret );
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate request message" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
|
|
ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssl->state++;
|
|
ssl->client_auth = ( ssl->in_msg[0] == MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST );
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "got %s certificate request",
|
|
ssl->client_auth ? "a" : "no" ) );
|
|
|
|
if( ssl->client_auth == 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
/* Current message is probably the ServerHelloDone */
|
|
ssl->keep_current_message = 1;
|
|
goto exit;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* struct {
|
|
* ClientCertificateType certificate_types<1..2^8-1>;
|
|
* SignatureAndHashAlgorithm
|
|
* supported_signature_algorithms<2^16-1>; -- TLS 1.2 only
|
|
* DistinguishedName certificate_authorities<0..2^16-1>;
|
|
* } CertificateRequest;
|
|
*
|
|
* Since we only support a single certificate on clients, let's just
|
|
* ignore all the information that's supposed to help us pick a
|
|
* certificate.
|
|
*
|
|
* We could check that our certificate matches the request, and bail out
|
|
* if it doesn't, but it's simpler to just send the certificate anyway,
|
|
* and give the server the opportunity to decide if it should terminate
|
|
* the connection when it doesn't like our certificate.
|
|
*
|
|
* Same goes for the hash in TLS 1.2's signature_algorithms: at this
|
|
* point we only have one hash available (see comments in
|
|
* write_certificate_verify), so let's just use what we have.
|
|
*
|
|
* However, we still minimally parse the message to check it is at least
|
|
* superficially sane.
|
|
*/
|
|
buf = ssl->in_msg;
|
|
|
|
/* certificate_types */
|
|
if( ssl->in_hslen <= mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate request message" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST );
|
|
}
|
|
cert_type_len = buf[mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl )];
|
|
n = cert_type_len;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* In the subsequent code there are two paths that read from buf:
|
|
* * the length of the signature algorithms field (if minor version of
|
|
* SSL is 3),
|
|
* * distinguished name length otherwise.
|
|
* Both reach at most the index:
|
|
* ...hdr_len + 2 + n,
|
|
* therefore the buffer length at this point must be greater than that
|
|
* regardless of the actual code path.
|
|
*/
|
|
if( ssl->in_hslen <= mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 2 + n )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate request message" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* supported_signature_algorithms */
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
|
|
if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 )
|
|
{
|
|
size_t sig_alg_len =
|
|
( ( buf[mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 1 + n] << 8 )
|
|
| ( buf[mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 2 + n] ) );
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C)
|
|
unsigned char* sig_alg;
|
|
size_t i;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The furthest access in buf is in the loop few lines below:
|
|
* sig_alg[i + 1],
|
|
* where:
|
|
* sig_alg = buf + ...hdr_len + 3 + n,
|
|
* max(i) = sig_alg_len - 1.
|
|
* Therefore the furthest access is:
|
|
* buf[...hdr_len + 3 + n + sig_alg_len - 1 + 1],
|
|
* which reduces to:
|
|
* buf[...hdr_len + 3 + n + sig_alg_len],
|
|
* which is one less than we need the buf to be.
|
|
*/
|
|
if( ssl->in_hslen <= mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl )
|
|
+ 3 + n + sig_alg_len )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate request message" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
|
|
ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_DEBUG_C)
|
|
sig_alg = buf + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 3 + n;
|
|
for( i = 0; i < sig_alg_len; i += 2 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3,
|
|
( "Supported Signature Algorithm found: %d,%d",
|
|
sig_alg[i], sig_alg[i + 1] ) );
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
n += 2 + sig_alg_len;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
|
|
|
|
/* certificate_authorities */
|
|
dn_len = ( ( buf[mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 1 + n] << 8 )
|
|
| ( buf[mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 2 + n] ) );
|
|
|
|
n += dn_len;
|
|
if( ssl->in_hslen != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + 3 + n )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate request message" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
exit:
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse certificate request" ) );
|
|
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
|
|
static int ssl_parse_server_hello_done( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
|
|
{
|
|
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse server hello done" ) );
|
|
|
|
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret );
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello done message" ) );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if( ssl->in_hslen != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) ||
|
|
ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad server hello done message" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssl->state++;
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
|
|
if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM )
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed( ssl );
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse server hello done" ) );
|
|
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
|
|
static int ssl_write_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
|
|
{
|
|
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
|
|
|
|
size_t header_len;
|
|
size_t content_len;
|
|
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
|
|
ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info;
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write client key exchange" ) );
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED)
|
|
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA )
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* DHM key exchange -- send G^X mod P
|
|
*/
|
|
content_len = ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.len;
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( content_len, ssl->out_msg, 4 );
|
|
header_len = 6;
|
|
|
|
ret = mbedtls_dhm_make_public( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx,
|
|
(int) mbedtls_mpi_size( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.P ),
|
|
&ssl->out_msg[header_len], content_len,
|
|
ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng );
|
|
if( ret != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_dhm_make_public", ret );
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: X ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.X );
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: GX", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.GX );
|
|
|
|
if( ( ret = mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx,
|
|
ssl->handshake->premaster,
|
|
MBEDTLS_PREMASTER_SIZE,
|
|
&ssl->handshake->pmslen,
|
|
ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ) ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret", ret );
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: K ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.K );
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED */
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \
|
|
( defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
|
|
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) )
|
|
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA ||
|
|
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA )
|
|
{
|
|
psa_status_t status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
|
|
psa_status_t destruction_status = PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
|
|
psa_key_attributes_t key_attributes;
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_params *handshake = ssl->handshake;
|
|
|
|
unsigned char own_pubkey[MBEDTLS_PSA_MAX_EC_PUBKEY_LENGTH];
|
|
size_t own_pubkey_len;
|
|
unsigned char *own_pubkey_ecpoint;
|
|
size_t own_pubkey_ecpoint_len;
|
|
|
|
header_len = 4;
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "Perform PSA-based ECDH computation." ) );
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Generate EC private key for ECDHE exchange.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
/* The master secret is obtained from the shared ECDH secret by
|
|
* applying the TLS 1.2 PRF with a specific salt and label. While
|
|
* the PSA Crypto API encourages combining key agreement schemes
|
|
* such as ECDH with fixed KDFs such as TLS 1.2 PRF, it does not
|
|
* yet support the provisioning of salt + label to the KDF.
|
|
* For the time being, we therefore need to split the computation
|
|
* of the ECDH secret and the application of the TLS 1.2 PRF. */
|
|
key_attributes = psa_key_attributes_init();
|
|
psa_set_key_usage_flags( &key_attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE );
|
|
psa_set_key_algorithm( &key_attributes, PSA_ALG_ECDH );
|
|
psa_set_key_type( &key_attributes, handshake->ecdh_psa_type );
|
|
psa_set_key_bits( &key_attributes, handshake->ecdh_bits );
|
|
|
|
/* Generate ECDH private key. */
|
|
status = psa_generate_key( &key_attributes,
|
|
&handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey );
|
|
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
|
|
|
|
/* Export the public part of the ECDH private key from PSA
|
|
* and convert it to ECPoint format used in ClientKeyExchange. */
|
|
status = psa_export_public_key( handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey,
|
|
own_pubkey, sizeof( own_pubkey ),
|
|
&own_pubkey_len );
|
|
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS )
|
|
{
|
|
psa_destroy_key( handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey );
|
|
handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if( mbedtls_psa_tls_psa_ec_to_ecpoint( own_pubkey,
|
|
own_pubkey_len,
|
|
&own_pubkey_ecpoint,
|
|
&own_pubkey_ecpoint_len ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
psa_destroy_key( handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey );
|
|
handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Copy ECPoint structure to outgoing message buffer. */
|
|
ssl->out_msg[header_len] = (unsigned char) own_pubkey_ecpoint_len;
|
|
memcpy( ssl->out_msg + header_len + 1,
|
|
own_pubkey_ecpoint, own_pubkey_ecpoint_len );
|
|
content_len = own_pubkey_ecpoint_len + 1;
|
|
|
|
/* The ECDH secret is the premaster secret used for key derivation. */
|
|
|
|
/* Compute ECDH shared secret. */
|
|
status = psa_raw_key_agreement( PSA_ALG_ECDH,
|
|
handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey,
|
|
handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey,
|
|
handshake->ecdh_psa_peerkey_len,
|
|
ssl->handshake->premaster,
|
|
sizeof( ssl->handshake->premaster ),
|
|
&ssl->handshake->pmslen );
|
|
|
|
destruction_status = psa_destroy_key( handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey );
|
|
handshake->ecdh_psa_privkey = MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT;
|
|
|
|
if( status != PSA_SUCCESS || destruction_status != PSA_SUCCESS )
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HW_ACCEL_FAILED );
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO &&
|
|
( MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED ||
|
|
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED ) */
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \
|
|
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \
|
|
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \
|
|
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED)
|
|
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA ||
|
|
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA ||
|
|
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA ||
|
|
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA )
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* ECDH key exchange -- send client public value
|
|
*/
|
|
header_len = 4;
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED)
|
|
if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled )
|
|
{
|
|
if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_state == ssl_ecrs_cke_ecdh_calc_secret )
|
|
goto ecdh_calc_secret;
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_ecdh_enable_restart( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx );
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
ret = mbedtls_ecdh_make_public( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
|
|
&content_len,
|
|
&ssl->out_msg[header_len], 1000,
|
|
ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng );
|
|
if( ret != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecdh_make_public", ret );
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED)
|
|
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS )
|
|
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS;
|
|
#endif
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH( 3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
|
|
MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Q );
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED)
|
|
if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled )
|
|
{
|
|
ssl->handshake->ecrs_n = content_len;
|
|
ssl->handshake->ecrs_state = ssl_ecrs_cke_ecdh_calc_secret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ecdh_calc_secret:
|
|
if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled )
|
|
content_len = ssl->handshake->ecrs_n;
|
|
#endif
|
|
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
|
|
&ssl->handshake->pmslen,
|
|
ssl->handshake->premaster,
|
|
MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE,
|
|
ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ) ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret", ret );
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED)
|
|
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS )
|
|
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS;
|
|
#endif
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH( 3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
|
|
MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Z );
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED ||
|
|
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED ||
|
|
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED ||
|
|
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED)
|
|
if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk( ciphersuite_info ) )
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* opaque psk_identity<0..2^16-1>;
|
|
*/
|
|
if( ssl_conf_has_static_psk( ssl->conf ) == 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
/* We don't offer PSK suites if we don't have a PSK,
|
|
* and we check that the server's choice is among the
|
|
* ciphersuites we offered, so this should never happen. */
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
header_len = 4;
|
|
content_len = ssl->conf->psk_identity_len;
|
|
|
|
if( header_len + 2 + content_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
|
|
( "psk identity too long or SSL buffer too short" ) );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssl->out_msg[header_len++] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( content_len );
|
|
ssl->out_msg[header_len++] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( content_len );
|
|
|
|
memcpy( ssl->out_msg + header_len,
|
|
ssl->conf->psk_identity,
|
|
ssl->conf->psk_identity_len );
|
|
header_len += ssl->conf->psk_identity_len;
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED)
|
|
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK )
|
|
{
|
|
content_len = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
#endif
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED)
|
|
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK )
|
|
{
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
|
|
/* Opaque PSKs are currently only supported for PSK-only suites. */
|
|
if( ssl_conf_has_static_raw_psk( ssl->conf ) == 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "opaque PSK not supported with RSA-PSK" ) );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
|
|
|
|
if( ( ret = ssl_write_encrypted_pms( ssl, header_len,
|
|
&content_len, 2 ) ) != 0 )
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
#endif
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED)
|
|
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK )
|
|
{
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
|
|
/* Opaque PSKs are currently only supported for PSK-only suites. */
|
|
if( ssl_conf_has_static_raw_psk( ssl->conf ) == 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "opaque PSK not supported with DHE-PSK" ) );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* ClientDiffieHellmanPublic public (DHM send G^X mod P)
|
|
*/
|
|
content_len = ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.len;
|
|
|
|
if( header_len + 2 + content_len >
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
|
|
( "psk identity or DHM size too long or SSL buffer too short" ) );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssl->out_msg[header_len++] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_1( content_len );
|
|
ssl->out_msg[header_len++] = MBEDTLS_BYTE_0( content_len );
|
|
|
|
ret = mbedtls_dhm_make_public( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx,
|
|
(int) mbedtls_mpi_size( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.P ),
|
|
&ssl->out_msg[header_len], content_len,
|
|
ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng );
|
|
if( ret != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_dhm_make_public", ret );
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED)
|
|
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK )
|
|
{
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO)
|
|
/* Opaque PSKs are currently only supported for PSK-only suites. */
|
|
if( ssl_conf_has_static_raw_psk( ssl->conf ) == 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "opaque PSK not supported with ECDHE-PSK" ) );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* ClientECDiffieHellmanPublic public;
|
|
*/
|
|
ret = mbedtls_ecdh_make_public( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
|
|
&content_len,
|
|
&ssl->out_msg[header_len],
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - header_len,
|
|
ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng );
|
|
if( ret != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecdh_make_public", ret );
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECDH( 3, &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx,
|
|
MBEDTLS_DEBUG_ECDH_Q );
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO) && \
|
|
defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED)
|
|
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK &&
|
|
ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 &&
|
|
ssl_conf_has_static_raw_psk( ssl->conf ) == 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1,
|
|
( "skip PMS generation for opaque PSK" ) );
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_USE_PSA_CRYPTO &&
|
|
MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED */
|
|
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster( ssl,
|
|
ciphersuite_info->key_exchange ) ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1,
|
|
"mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster", ret );
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_SOME_PSK_ENABLED */
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED)
|
|
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA )
|
|
{
|
|
header_len = 4;
|
|
if( ( ret = ssl_write_encrypted_pms( ssl, header_len,
|
|
&content_len, 0 ) ) != 0 )
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED */
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED)
|
|
if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE )
|
|
{
|
|
header_len = 4;
|
|
|
|
ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx,
|
|
ssl->out_msg + header_len,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_OUT_CONTENT_LEN - header_len,
|
|
&content_len,
|
|
ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng );
|
|
if( ret != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two", ret );
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx,
|
|
ssl->handshake->premaster, 32, &ssl->handshake->pmslen,
|
|
ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng );
|
|
if( ret != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret", ret );
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED */
|
|
{
|
|
((void) ciphersuite_info);
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssl->out_msglen = header_len + content_len;
|
|
ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE;
|
|
ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE;
|
|
|
|
ssl->state++;
|
|
|
|
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( ssl ) ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret );
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write client key exchange" ) );
|
|
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED)
|
|
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
|
|
static int ssl_write_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
|
|
{
|
|
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
|
|
ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info;
|
|
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write certificate verify" ) );
|
|
|
|
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( ssl ) ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys", ret );
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if( !mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed( ciphersuite_info ) )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip write certificate verify" ) );
|
|
ssl->state++;
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
|
|
}
|
|
#else /* !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */
|
|
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
|
|
static int ssl_write_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
|
|
{
|
|
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE;
|
|
const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info =
|
|
ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info;
|
|
size_t n = 0, offset = 0;
|
|
unsigned char hash[48];
|
|
unsigned char *hash_start = hash;
|
|
mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE;
|
|
size_t hashlen;
|
|
void *rs_ctx = NULL;
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write certificate verify" ) );
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED)
|
|
if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled &&
|
|
ssl->handshake->ecrs_state == ssl_ecrs_crt_vrfy_sign )
|
|
{
|
|
goto sign;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( ssl ) ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys", ret );
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if( !mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_cert_req_allowed( ciphersuite_info ) )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip write certificate verify" ) );
|
|
ssl->state++;
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if( ssl->client_auth == 0 || mbedtls_ssl_own_cert( ssl ) == NULL )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip write certificate verify" ) );
|
|
ssl->state++;
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if( mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl ) == NULL )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got no private key for certificate" ) );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Make a signature of the handshake digests
|
|
*/
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED)
|
|
if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled )
|
|
ssl->handshake->ecrs_state = ssl_ecrs_crt_vrfy_sign;
|
|
|
|
sign:
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
ssl->handshake->calc_verify( ssl, hash, &hashlen );
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \
|
|
defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1)
|
|
if( ssl->minor_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 )
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* digitally-signed struct {
|
|
* opaque md5_hash[16];
|
|
* opaque sha_hash[20];
|
|
* };
|
|
*
|
|
* md5_hash
|
|
* MD5(handshake_messages);
|
|
*
|
|
* sha_hash
|
|
* SHA(handshake_messages);
|
|
*/
|
|
md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* For ECDSA, default hash is SHA-1 only
|
|
*/
|
|
if( mbedtls_pk_can_do( mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl ), MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA ) )
|
|
{
|
|
hash_start += 16;
|
|
hashlen -= 16;
|
|
md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || \
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2)
|
|
if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 )
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* digitally-signed struct {
|
|
* opaque handshake_messages[handshake_messages_length];
|
|
* };
|
|
*
|
|
* Taking shortcut here. We assume that the server always allows the
|
|
* PRF Hash function and has sent it in the allowed signature
|
|
* algorithms list received in the Certificate Request message.
|
|
*
|
|
* Until we encounter a server that does not, we will take this
|
|
* shortcut.
|
|
*
|
|
* Reason: Otherwise we should have running hashes for SHA512 and
|
|
* SHA224 in order to satisfy 'weird' needs from the server
|
|
* side.
|
|
*/
|
|
if( ssl->handshake->ciphersuite_info->mac == MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 )
|
|
{
|
|
md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384;
|
|
ssl->out_msg[4] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
{
|
|
md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA256;
|
|
ssl->out_msg[4] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256;
|
|
}
|
|
ssl->out_msg[5] = mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk( mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl ) );
|
|
|
|
/* Info from md_alg will be used instead */
|
|
hashlen = 0;
|
|
offset = 2;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED)
|
|
if( ssl->handshake->ecrs_enabled )
|
|
rs_ctx = &ssl->handshake->ecrs_ctx.pk;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_sign_restartable( mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl ),
|
|
md_alg, hash_start, hashlen,
|
|
ssl->out_msg + 6 + offset, &n,
|
|
ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng, rs_ctx ) ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_pk_sign", ret );
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ECP_RESTARTABLE_ENABLED)
|
|
if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_IN_PROGRESS )
|
|
ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_CRYPTO_IN_PROGRESS;
|
|
#endif
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_PUT_UINT16_BE( n, ssl->out_msg, offset + 4 );
|
|
|
|
ssl->out_msglen = 6 + n + offset;
|
|
ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE;
|
|
ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY;
|
|
|
|
ssl->state++;
|
|
|
|
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg( ssl ) ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_handshake_msg", ret );
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write certificate verify" ) );
|
|
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_CERT_REQ_ALLOWED_ENABLED */
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
|
|
MBEDTLS_CHECK_RETURN_CRITICAL
|
|
static int ssl_parse_new_session_ticket( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
|
|
{
|
|
int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED;
|
|
uint32_t lifetime;
|
|
size_t ticket_len;
|
|
unsigned char *ticket;
|
|
const unsigned char *msg;
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse new session ticket" ) );
|
|
|
|
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl, 1 ) ) != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret );
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad new session ticket message" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message(
|
|
ssl,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* struct {
|
|
* uint32 ticket_lifetime_hint;
|
|
* opaque ticket<0..2^16-1>;
|
|
* } NewSessionTicket;
|
|
*
|
|
* 0 . 3 ticket_lifetime_hint
|
|
* 4 . 5 ticket_len (n)
|
|
* 6 . 5+n ticket content
|
|
*/
|
|
if( ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET ||
|
|
ssl->in_hslen < 6 + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad new session ticket message" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
msg = ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl );
|
|
|
|
lifetime = ( ((uint32_t) msg[0]) << 24 ) | ( msg[1] << 16 ) |
|
|
( msg[2] << 8 ) | ( msg[3] );
|
|
|
|
ticket_len = ( msg[4] << 8 ) | ( msg[5] );
|
|
|
|
if( ticket_len + 6 + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) != ssl->in_hslen )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad new session ticket message" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_DECODE_ERROR );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ticket length: %" MBEDTLS_PRINTF_SIZET, ticket_len ) );
|
|
|
|
/* We're not waiting for a NewSessionTicket message any more */
|
|
ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket = 0;
|
|
ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Zero-length ticket means the server changed his mind and doesn't want
|
|
* to send a ticket after all, so just forget it
|
|
*/
|
|
if( ticket_len == 0 )
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
|
|
if( ssl->session != NULL && ssl->session->ticket != NULL )
|
|
{
|
|
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ssl->session->ticket,
|
|
ssl->session->ticket_len );
|
|
mbedtls_free( ssl->session->ticket );
|
|
ssl->session->ticket = NULL;
|
|
ssl->session->ticket_len = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
mbedtls_platform_zeroize( ssl->session_negotiate->ticket,
|
|
ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_len );
|
|
mbedtls_free( ssl->session_negotiate->ticket );
|
|
ssl->session_negotiate->ticket = NULL;
|
|
ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_len = 0;
|
|
|
|
if( ( ticket = mbedtls_calloc( 1, ticket_len ) ) == NULL )
|
|
{
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "ticket alloc failed" ) );
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL,
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INTERNAL_ERROR );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memcpy( ticket, msg + 6, ticket_len );
|
|
|
|
ssl->session_negotiate->ticket = ticket;
|
|
ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_len = ticket_len;
|
|
ssl->session_negotiate->ticket_lifetime = lifetime;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* RFC 5077 section 3.4:
|
|
* "If the client receives a session ticket from the server, then it
|
|
* discards any Session ID that was sent in the ServerHello."
|
|
*/
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ticket in use, discarding session id" ) );
|
|
ssl->session_negotiate->id_len = 0;
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse new session ticket" ) );
|
|
|
|
return( 0 );
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* SSL handshake -- client side -- single step
|
|
*/
|
|
int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_client_step( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl )
|
|
{
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
if( ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER || ssl->handshake == NULL )
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
|
|
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "client state: %d", ssl->state ) );
|
|
|
|
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( ssl ) ) != 0 )
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS)
|
|
if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM &&
|
|
ssl->handshake->retransmit_state == MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING )
|
|
{
|
|
if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flight_transmit( ssl ) ) != 0 )
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */
|
|
|
|
/* Change state now, so that it is right in mbedtls_ssl_read_record(), used
|
|
* by DTLS for dropping out-of-sequence ChangeCipherSpec records */
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
|
|
if( ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC &&
|
|
ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket != 0 )
|
|
{
|
|
ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NEW_SESSION_TICKET;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
switch( ssl->state )
|
|
{
|
|
case MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST:
|
|
ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* ==> ClientHello
|
|
*/
|
|
case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO:
|
|
ret = ssl_write_client_hello( ssl );
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* <== ServerHello
|
|
* Certificate
|
|
* ( ServerKeyExchange )
|
|
* ( CertificateRequest )
|
|
* ServerHelloDone
|
|
*/
|
|
case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO:
|
|
ret = ssl_parse_server_hello( ssl );
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CERTIFICATE:
|
|
ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate( ssl );
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE:
|
|
ret = ssl_parse_server_key_exchange( ssl );
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST:
|
|
ret = ssl_parse_certificate_request( ssl );
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_DONE:
|
|
ret = ssl_parse_server_hello_done( ssl );
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* ==> ( Certificate/Alert )
|
|
* ClientKeyExchange
|
|
* ( CertificateVerify )
|
|
* ChangeCipherSpec
|
|
* Finished
|
|
*/
|
|
case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE:
|
|
ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate( ssl );
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE:
|
|
ret = ssl_write_client_key_exchange( ssl );
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY:
|
|
ret = ssl_write_certificate_verify( ssl );
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
|
|
ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_change_cipher_spec( ssl );
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED:
|
|
ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_finished( ssl );
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* <== ( NewSessionTicket )
|
|
* ChangeCipherSpec
|
|
* Finished
|
|
*/
|
|
#if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS)
|
|
case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NEW_SESSION_TICKET:
|
|
ret = ssl_parse_new_session_ticket( ssl );
|
|
break;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
|
|
ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_change_cipher_spec( ssl );
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED:
|
|
ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_finished( ssl );
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case MBEDTLS_SSL_FLUSH_BUFFERS:
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "handshake: done" ) );
|
|
ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP:
|
|
mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup( ssl );
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "invalid state %d", ssl->state ) );
|
|
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return( ret );
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_CLI_C */
|